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In this paper, I challenge the traditional narrative that William 
James’s arguments against determinism were primarily motivated 
by his personal struggles with depression. I argue that James 
presents an alternative argument against determinism that is 
motivated by his commitment to sound scientific practice. James 
argues that determinism illegitimately extrapolates from 
observations of past events to predictions about future events 
without acknowledging the distinct metaphysical difference 
between them. This occupation with futurity suggests that James’s 
true target is better understood as logical determinism rather than 
causal determinism. This has consequences for James’s proposed 
alternative, which I call his probabilistic underdeterminism, a 
conception of the universe that is built on chance, choice, and a 
local teleology. All of this forms part of a broader criticism of the 
scientific practices of his day based on their widespread failure to 
acknowledge the distorting effects of observation on that which is 
observed.  
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he traditional narrative about William James’s 
arguments against determinism suggests that his 
hostility to determinism was motivated primarily by his 
personal struggles with depression. This view is 
reinforced by the fact that James tends to resort to moral arguments 
instead of metaphysical or scientific ones, even when he is 
working within such a context. If this is the case, then scholars are 
right to view James’s arguments as an exercise in self-assurance 
rather than a serious challenge to the doctrine. However, I believe 
that this narrative is incomplete. While it is right to claim that there 
is a deep connection between James’s mental and physical health 
and his attitude towards determinism, he presents an alternative 
argument against determinism that is nuanced, powerful, and in no 
way motivated by his personal struggles. The purpose of this paper 
is to articulate this argument and draw out its consequences for our 
approach to James on this topic. 
In the first section of this paper, I argue that the target of 
James’s arguments against determinism is not as straightforward as 
traditionally thought, for he accepts that certain forms of 
determinism are explanatorily helpful in scientific activity. As 
such, I argue that it is more helpful to think of James’s arguments 
as being against logical determinism rather than causal or material 
determinism. In section two, I articulate James’s argument against 
logical determinism that is motivated not by his personal struggles, 
but rather his commitment to sound scientific practice. James 
argues that logical determinism illegitimately extrapolates the 
causal structure of future events from that of past events without 
acknowledging either the metaphysical difference between those 
events or the distorting effect that observation has on our 
conception of those events. James’s proffered alternative to logical 
determinism is presented in section three; which I refer to as his 
probabilistic underdeterminism. In section four, I demonstrate how 
this argument is part of a broader criticism of the prevailing 
scientific methodologies of James’s day in order to bolster my 
claim that this is scientifically motivated, and consider what this 
means for our conception of James as a scientist. 
T 
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WHICH DETERMINISM? 
The traditional narrative about James’s struggle with determinism 
has two key features. First, it holds that his struggle with 
determinism was intimately connected with his physical and 
mental health. Second, it holds that James’s ultimate rejection of 
determinism was on personal, non-scientific grounds. I wish to 
affirm the first feature and deny the second feature. 
The relation of James’s struggle with determinism to his 
physical and mental health is well-documented and, in my 
estimation, above dispute. As the story goes, James’s severe 
depression in his youth made determinism attractive, and his 
deterministic mindset deepened his depression. Robert D. 
Richardson notes that James’s initial attraction to determinism was 
intimately connected to the physical health of himself and those 
close to him; the death of a close friend hit him particularly hard.
1
 
Jacques Barzun observes that a significant low point for James 
occurred as he was undertaking his medical degree, given 
reductive materialism’s explanatorily powerful role in that 
science.
2
 John J. McDermott suggests that questions of free will 
were integral to James’s contemplation of suicide.3 Most 
commentators agree that James only emerged from his depression 
after having been, in the words of Richardson, “reborn 
emotionally” through the professional and personal stability gained 
by securing a position at Harvard and marrying Alice Gibbens.
4
 
This emotional rebirth coincided with his engagement with the 
works of Charles Renouvier, which eventually emboldened James 
to make his first act of free will: to believe in free will.
5
 This led to 
James writing his ‘crisis texts,’ which sought to “develop a 
doctrine to sustain such a belief [in free will]”;6 it is here that we 
find James’s most ardent anti-determinist writings. Thus, the first 
feature of the traditional narrative about his struggle with 
determinism seems well-established: The struggle was, in some 
way, intimately connected with James’s physical and mental well-
being. 
The second feature of the traditional narrative concerns the 
nature and merit of the specific arguments James advances against 
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determinism. Many scholars hold to the idea that since his struggle 
with determinism was highly personal, James’s arguments against 
determinism are personally motivated to an unacceptable degree. 
This idea is presented most forcefully by Richard Gale. Gale, who 
claims that James’s arguments against determinism “amount to 
nothing but a skein of question-begging rhetorical definitions.”7 
Further, Gale argues that James’s positive arguments for 
indeterminism employed emotive language and traded on common 
sense intuitions about regret in the place of an intellectually 
rigorous argument.
8
 Gale sees James’s arguments against 
determinism as a psychological exercise meant to assuage his own 
concerns about freedom rather than being a rigorous philosophical 
engagement.
9
 As such, they are unworthy of serious consideration 
outside of biographical interest about James.
10
 Similar, albeit more 
charitable, examples of this narrative can be found in the works of 
Charlene Haddock Seigfried,
11
 McDermott,
12
 Richardson,
13
 and 
others. 
While personal motivations undoubtedly played a role in 
James’s rejection of determinism, I believe that James’s 
motivations are more complicated than is traditionally assumed. 
The traditional narrative fails to capture two aspects of James’s 
arguments against determinism. First, it does not recognize that his 
hostility is reserved only for one form of determinism. I argue that 
taking James’s target to be logical determinism, rather than causal 
determinism, better reflects his concern with futurity and 
foreknowledge. Second, the traditional narrative does not pay 
sufficient attention to the scientific motivation behind James’s 
argument against determinism. I will discuss the first point in this 
section and address the second point in the next. 
A strong point in favor of the idea that James does not reject all 
forms of determinism is that James himself explicitly endorses 
determinism under certain specific circumstances, a point to which 
he returns repeatedly, especially in his more scientific works. In 
the preface to The Principles of Psychology, James claims that a 
psychologist “assumes certain data uncritically” for his or her work 
to even be possible (e.g., the existence of thoughts and feelings).
14
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This statement caused a furor in the scientific community, 
provoking negative reviews and responses to Principles.
15
 James 
defended his claim in his 1892 article, “A Plea for Psychology as a 
‘Natural Science,’” in which he observes that any natural science 
must “make a number of convenient assumptions” in order to 
function.
16
 Whatever these assumptions are, they are all validated 
in the same manner: by their explanatory or predictive power as 
determined through their careful deployment in hypothesis-
testing.
17
 James makes the same point in his 1911 book Some 
Problems of Philosophy and illustrates his point with the example 
of atomistic physics. Although atomism is prima facie “absurd,” 
James notes that it is so useful for explaining scientific 
observations that “we adopt [it] unhesitatingly” along with the 
related assumption that “the laws by which we describe [atomic 
structures’] habits are uniform in the strictest mathematical 
sense.”18 In this, we see the same commitment expressed twenty 
years earlier, that science must posit “convenient assumptions” to 
function. If they are unhelpful or lead to questionable predictions 
(or retrodictions) about observed phenomena, then the assumption 
would be abandoned in favor of a more explanatorily powerful 
assumption.
19
 
James claims that the most important convenient assumption of 
any science is that of hard determinism, or the belief that all events 
will progress according to observable and predictable laws.
20
 This 
is the case because “[a]ll natural sciences aim at practical 
predictions and control,” which is only possible if like causes lead 
to like events in a lawful manner.
21
 James gave longstanding 
support for the idea that psychology should follow the natural 
sciences, including the incorporation of hard determinism into its 
methodology. Years before his “Plea,” or even the publication of 
The Principles, James stated in an 1884 letter to the editor of Open 
Court that he “claim[s] determinism in the interest of scientific 
activity” to rebuff the charge that he held an anti-scientific 
methodological libertarianism.
22
 James carried this methodological 
hard determinism with him throughout his career, and not just in 
his psychology. In Pragmatism, James explicitly rejects the 
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possibility that there can be events which cause other events, but 
are not themselves caused.
23
 Ultimately, like all convenient 
assumptions, determinism must be judged on its usefulness. James 
finds it quite useful—and indeed, necessary—in certain domains, a 
position he never recanted. Determinism qua determinism does not 
seem to be the target of James’s arguments. 
The question of which forms of determinism are the true 
targets of James’s arguments persisted throughout his career, 
exacerbated by his notorious penchant for being unclear with his 
terms and inconsistent with their use. This penchant carried over 
into James’s correspondence as well. In Shadworth Hollway 
Hodgson’s March 6, 1886 letter to James, Hodgson complained 
that in previous correspondence James had taken determinism to 
be synonymous with fatalism and then had proceeded to criticize 
this strawman of his position.
24
 The clearest distinction James 
makes between the two is in “The Dilemma of Determinism,” 
where he argues that the “fatalistic mood of mind” is one possible 
response to the particular form of determinism with which he takes 
issue;
25
 or seen in another way, fatalism is a subspecies of the 
problematic form of determinism. The form of determinism that 
leads to fatalism is the form that: 
 
professes that those parts of the universe already 
laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the 
other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous 
possibilities hidden in its womb; the part we call the 
present is compatible with only one totality. Any 
other future complement than the one fixed from 
eternity is impossible. The whole is in each and 
every part, and welds it with the rest into an 
absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be 
no equivocation or shadow of turning.
26
  
 
This passage gives us two features of the “iron block" view of the 
universe that James finds problematic. First, such a view holds that 
for any point in the future, there is, at most, one possible state of 
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affairs. Such a view holds that for any event p, the antecedent 
states of affairs of p are the sufficient cause of p. As such, to 
understand why p is the case, we merely need to examine the 
antecedent state of affairs while armed with a knowledge of the 
causal mechanisms of physics. If we have a complete idea of all 
the forces at play, we can, in principle, perfectly predict all future 
states of affairs. The second feature of such a view is a 
consequence of the first. If there is at most one possible state of 
affairs, then any appearance of multiple possible future states of 
affairs (what James calls ambiguity) is illusory. If the future looks 
ambiguous, then there must be an as-yet undiscovered cause that, 
once discovered, would eradicate the apparent ambiguity. This is 
typically explained as a function of our limited viewpoint: If we 
had improved methods of observation, then we would be able to 
see the necessity of each state of affairs. Any form of determinism 
that makes both claims falls under this category and is subject to 
James’s arguments.  
James’s rejection of the iron block view has been noticed by 
James scholars; the very term is one of the rhetorical definitions 
about which Gale complains.
27
 James’s hostility to the iron block 
view creates a tension in his thought. Although James claims 
determinism precisely for the predictive ability that it affords, he 
rejects the iron block view, in part, due to its use of that predictive 
ability. This tension is central to those who advance a “divided 
self” narrative of James, wherein his scientifically-minded self is 
constantly at odds with his moralistically-minded self. However, it 
is only maintained in conditions under which James believes that 
the debate cannot be settled in his favor. Most treatments of 
determinism, including those of James’s arguments against 
determinism, extrapolate the causal structure of future events from 
those of past events. James believes that such an extrapolation will 
invariably lead to an iron block view of the universe, and as such, 
any claim to indeterminism is obviously false.
 28
 James believes 
that extrapolating the future from the past is neither necessary nor 
legitimate, for extrapolating in this fashion ignores significant 
differences in the causal structures between past events and future 
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events.
29
 While this argument developed slowly and was only 
explicitly articulated later in his career, James’s concern with 
futurity is reflected throughout his corpus and his personal 
correspondence. It was noted explicitly by Hodgson, who 
remarked that James was preoccupied with forms of determinism 
that make a claim to a static future, such as predeterminism or 
fatalism, to the exclusion of forms of determinism that did not 
make such claims about the future.
30
 This suggests that despite 
laying out the iron block view in the manner previously described, 
James’s primary concern is not the claim that the universe 
progresses in a lawlike fashion, but rather that the progression of 
the universe is towards one necessary future state of affairs. He 
accepts that there will be only one way that the future will be, but 
rejects that there is more than one way it could be. 
Given James’s acceptance of hard determinism in some cases 
and his overriding concern with claims to the necessary state of 
future events, I submit that it is more fruitful to think of James’s 
target as being logical determinism rather than causal determinism, 
even if he never expressed it in those terms. Logical determinism 
claims that all propositions about future events have a definite and 
static truth value. Since this is the case, all future events must 
occur by logical necessity. Gilbert Ryle explains this position as 
being: 
 
Whatever anyone does, whatever happens anywhere 
to anything, could not not be done or happen, if it 
was true beforehand that it was going to be done or 
was going to happen. So everything, including 
everything that we do, has been definitely booked 
from any earlier date you like to choose. Whatever 
is, was to be.
31
 
 
Causal determinism claims that one could perfectly predict any 
future state of affairs if armed with a sufficiently detailed 
knowledge of physics and knowledge about a past or present state 
of affairs. In such a scheme, predictions will only be validated (or 
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falsified) when the predicted event occurs (or fails to occur). 
Logical determinism makes an even stronger claim—that since 
proposition p about future event e already has a truth value, there is 
already a fact of the matter about e that allows for p to have its 
truth value. In some sense, e has already happened. J. R. Lucas 
argues that logical determinism “exclude[s] the possibility of a 
subsequent change of mind, and in some cases—long-range 
predictions—exclude[s] the possibility of any factor under the 
agent’s control being relevant.”32 The notion of agential control is 
central to James’s antipathy towards this form of determinism. As 
we shall see, he argues that what an agent does can be relevant to 
causal determinism if causation is understood probabilistically. 
Logical determinism admits no such possibility; the future is, in 
the words of Ryle, definitely booked. This explains why James 
thought that fatalism was a “mood of mind” brought about by his 
target form of determinism: if the future is fixed, then one naturally 
wonders how the future is fixed. One possible explanation is divine 
predetermination, whereby the fixity of future events is rooted in 
God’s infinite knowledge and infallibility. If His knowledge is 
infinite, then God knows what will happen in the future. If God is 
infallible, then whatever He believes about the future is true and 
unchanging. Necessitarianism and fatalism are other explanations 
for why the future is as static and fixed as the past. 
The context of Hodgson’s termination of his correspondence 
with James further reinforces the appropriateness of considering 
James’s arguments in the light of logical determinism. Hodgson 
eventually terminated his correspondence with James because 
James refused to budge on his position that determinism and free 
will are incompatible, especially with respect to bringing about 
future states of affairs.
33
 James, however, never shows any 
reluctance to talk about physiological or psychological causes of 
behavior or deny the fact that all behavior will have a cause. It is 
the status of future events that troubles James—the idea that the 
world could be otherwise. In fact, his entire project of meliorism 
rests on the assumption that the universe is responsive to individual 
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striving; this would be impossible if the future was already as set 
as the past.  
Understanding James’s target as logical determinism alleviates 
much of the tension described earlier. He can maintain 
methodological hard determinism while rejecting logical 
determinism given the role that determinism is meant to play in 
science. The scientific upshot of methodological hard determinism 
is its predictive power. As an assumption, it is quite successful. 
Logical determinism, in contrast, affords no extra success to 
science while making unnecessary metaphysical commitments 
about the state of the universe. Logical determinism adds nothing 
to science that causal determinism does not bring to the table, 
while entailing more problematic views about the state of the 
universe. Given James’s standards for maintaining or rejecting the 
convenient assumptions of science, logical determinism ought to 
be jettisoned, while causal determinism ought to be maintained.  
In sum, James does not reject all forms of determinism, but 
only a particular subclass thereof. This alone problematizes the 
feature of the traditional narrative that James rejected determinism 
for personal reasons; he cannot be said to have rejected 
determinism wholesale if he claims determinism for himself in 
some cases. However, it could still be the case that James rejected 
logical determinism for merely personal reasons. I will now turn to 
a neglected argument against determinism that is motivated by 
James’s commitment to sound scientific practice and its attendant 
commitment to methodological hard determinism.   
 
CONCRETE POSSIBILITIES AND LOGICAL 
DETERMINISM 
James’s scientifically-motivated argument against determinism is 
straightforward yet powerful. In a nutshell, James claims that 
determinists fail to consider the effect that one’s observational 
standpoint has on one’s conception of the thing observed, 
especially with respect to how an event’s temporal status affects its 
causal history. Past events will always appear to have been 
determined because they are past; the passage of time has whittled 
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away possible alternatives that existed before that event was in the 
past.
34
 The previously dynamic relations between that event, the 
events preceding it, and the events to which it leads are made 
static. One should expect that past events look determined, because 
past events are wholly determined. The mistake is to expect that 
future events would have the same static relations, since static 
relations are solely the property of past events.  
James’s argument rests on his account of how concretely 
possible events are actualized. He notes that everything is possible 
when taken abstractly—even a squared circle—but there are 
barriers to those abstract ideas from being actualized.
35
 For James, 
an event is concretely possible if there are no “preventative 
conditions” present for that event to occur and that some 
“conditions of production” of that event are met.36 Preventative 
conditions are general for and apply to all events. They include 
logical impossibility, “incompatibility with the given laws of 
nature,” and contradiction with incompatible actual facts.37 
Conditions of production are specific to the event in question, 
because each kind of event will have a unique set of conditions 
required for that event to come about.
38
 As preventative conditions 
disappear and more conditions of production are met, the event 
becomes more and more concretely possible. James applies this to 
the case of a chicken: “Thus concrete possible chicken means: (1) 
that the idea of chicken contains no essential self-contradiction; (2) 
that no boys, skunks, or other enemies are about; and (3) that at 
least an actual egg exists.”39 In this example, (1) and (2) are the 
preventative conditions, while (3) is a condition of production. 
While (1) is common across all events, (2) introduces probabilistic 
considerations regarding the specific type of event under 
consideration. Incompatible actual facts do not make it any less 
possible that chickens qua chickens exist, but rather affect the 
probability that a chicken can be found in such circumstances. 
James summarizes, “As the actual conditions approach 
completeness the chicken becomes a better-and-better-grounded 
possibility. When the conditions are entirely complete, it ceases to 
be a possibility, and turns into an actual fact.”40 James’s universe is 
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dynamic and in a state of perpetual growth that requires constraints 
to keep the growth in check.
41
  
James’s account of actualization suggests that there is a distinct 
metaphysical structure between past and future events that will 
lead to identifiable and predictable differences emerging from 
one’s observational standpoint. The process of actualization 
ensures that all past events or states of affairs will have a causal 
structure which suggests that they are determined. For p to be 
actualized, the preventative conditions of p must be removed and 
the conditions of production for p must be met. Only once all the 
necessary conditions for a state of affairs becomes sufficient, then, 
and only then, will that state of affairs come about. This explains 
why it is the case that all past events seem to be fully determined—
they only happen when their conditions are met, so of course it 
would seem as though they were determined to come about. 
However, this only occurs with the fullness of time and only 
because of the removal of all impediments, a set which includes 
contrary or contradictory states of affairs.
42
 Even events or states 
of affairs that are the result of what James calls absolute chance 
will look determined after they happen. As James notes, any event 
“after it happens will have been necessary,” but it only appears that 
way because it is in the observer’s past.43 
This passage from Pragmatism discussed in the previous 
paragraph helps clarify the point of James’s example of choosing 
which route to take home after a lecture (found in “The Dilemma 
of Determinism”). James asks us to suppose that there are only two 
ways to walk home, either by Divinity Avenue or by Oxford 
Street. Further suppose that the “choice is made twice over, and 
each time falls on a different street.”44 Logical determinists in each 
of the alternative universes will see one’s choice of route as being 
fully determined and necessary, and would view the alternative 
world as an impossibility borne of our imaginations.
45
 But 
someone from a third universe would see that each universe was 
possible before the choice was made; to insist otherwise is “a mere 
conception fulminated as a dogma and based on no insight into 
details.”46 As James states, “[I]t is [determinists] rather who seem 
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to make nature continuous; and in their strange and intense 
function of granting consent to one possibility and withholding it 
from another, to transform an equivocal and double future into an 
unalterable and simple past.”47 
The ironblock universe is thus a product of not taking into 
account the metaphysical differences between past events and 
future events. An issue remains for James: Despite describing the 
process by which concretely possible events become actual events, 
James provides little insight into which possibilities will in fact 
become actualities. In other words, what determines the removal of 
the preventative conditions or the meeting of the conditions of 
production? How do past events lead to future events, if logical 
determinism is false? To answer these questions, we must look into 
James’s proposed alternative to determinism. 
 
JAMES’S PROBABLISTIC UNDERDETERMINSIM 
James’s own view is built on three core tenets: first, the belief that 
chance is the vital force for determining which events occur; 
second, the belief that humans have evolved to a point where they 
have the ability to manipulate events and can therefore increase or 
decrease the probability of that event occurring; and third, the 
rejection of global teleology. These tenets are captured best by 
James’s assertion that in his system, “possibilities may be in excess 
of actualities, and that things not yet revealed to our knowledge 
may really in themselves be ambiguous.”48 When taken together, 
these tenets establish what I refer to as James’s probabilistic 
underdeterminism.
49
 
The first tenet of James’s probabilistic underdeterminism is 
that chance is the primary means by which events are selected. 
This view is informed by his deep commitment to Darwinism.
50
 
James argues that the worldview necessitated by Darwin is that of 
a “sort of table on which dice are continually being thrown.”51 
Chance is an integral part of James’s worldview. James notes that 
chance typically carries with it connotations of randomness and 
irrationality, but he is clear that he intends to use it in its negative 
sense, denoting merely cases in which an event is “not controlled, 
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secured, or necessitated by other things in advance of its own 
actual presence.”52 James is not claiming that there are events 
which do not have any causal antecedents. Rather, his argument is 
that there are points at which the material conditions of the 
universe are insufficient to cause any of the possible states of 
affairs resulting from it. Instead, the material conditions of the 
universe may make one state of affairs more likely than the other; 
however, it is still possible that this state of affairs is not 
actualized. 
Consider this in terms of probability.
53
 Logical determinists 
insist that all events have a probability of either zero or one, and 
that all apparent probabilities differing from this are a function of 
our ignorance of causes. In James’s words, according to 
determinism, “necessity on the one hand and impossibility on the 
other are the sole categories of the real. Possibilities that fail to get 
realized are, for determinism, pure illusions: they were never 
possibilities at all.”54 James instead argues that events can have an 
actual probability that falls somewhere between zero and one: “Of 
the two alternative futures which we conceive, both may now be 
really possible; and the one become impossible only at the very 
moment when the other excludes it by becoming real itself.”55 
Note that this does not mean that the apparent probability that we 
assign matches its actual probability; there is still plenty of room 
for errors based on ignorance and standpoint.
56
 The important part 
is that, independent of our assignment, future states of affairs can 
have an actual probability that has a value of between zero and 
one. James thus means that “possibilities may be in excess of 
actualities” in a literal sense: The many universes that could be 
actualized greatly outnumber the one universe that is actually 
actualized. The future is thus ambiguous, because there is nothing 
in the past which necessitates only one possible state of affairs.
57
 
For James, chance is an inextricable property of the universe, 
and is responsible for much of its progress.
58
 While granting that 
all events are either more or less probable, he still acknowledges 
that something has to happen, and that what will happen is largely 
up to chance. James writes that we “must admit that the content of 
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the moment of choice is chance, as far as the rest of the world 
goes. The universe is as yet inchoate.”59 The last sentence is key to 
understanding James’s point. The world is incomplete and 
growing, and as it progresses, it “would grow by finite buds or 
drops, either nothing coming at all, or certain units of amount 
bursting into being ‘at a stroke’.”60 While some parts of the 
universe may influence other parts of the universe with respect to 
which possibilities exist, chance will always get the final say about 
what is actualized, when, and to what extent.
61
 
The second tenet of James’s probabilistic underdeterminism is 
that despite chance having the final say, human choice has a 
significant role in shaping the progress of the universe. In a 
deterministic system, the universe is cold, uncaring, and all of 
one’s struggles against it are futile. Not only is your success 
determined by outside forces, your very struggle is subsumed by 
those same forces. In James’s system, the universe is still cold and 
uncaring, but one’s struggles actually can affect the complexion of 
the universe. 
Although mentioned briefly in “The Dilemma of 
Determinism,” this line of thinking comes into its own as part of 
James’s defense of meliorism found near the end of Pragmatism. 
James argues that “Meliorism treats salvation as neither inevitable 
nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more 
and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions 
of salvation become.”62 The “actual conditions of salvation” are 
something that we can do based on the choices that we make. The 
universe, being ambivalent about which possibilities are 
actualized, may end up unable to adequately effect one state of the 
universe to be actualized over others. James claims that these cases 
have “a gap that we can spring into” with “our act”;63 that is, we 
can nudge the universe towards a certain state. To borrow language 
James uses elsewhere, the function of choice may be to “incline the 
beam” in favor of one probability over another, potentially tipping 
the scales and bringing that possibility about.
64
 
Observation again plays a role in determining how we interpret 
the progress of the universe. James opines that retrospective 
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analyses of events can yield a variety of equally compelling causal 
stories.
65
 A retrospective analysis of the event could be agent-
causal, if that is how one interprets the event. However, a 
retrospective analysis would admit to an event-causal description, 
or even a hard determinist view, for its relations are solidified and 
fixed. However, if the preferences and choices of individuals 
contribute to—or impede—the conditions required to actualize a 
state of affairs, and that chance ultimately determines which 
possibilities are actualized, then it cannot be the case that we could 
ever perfectly predict the future, let alone claim that propositions 
about the future have a definite truth value. The future must have 
multiple real possibilities that are in excess of the one reality. 
The third tenet of James’s probabilistic underdeterminism is 
that he rejects any form of global teleology, be it an underlying 
force compelling the universe in a particular direction (e.g., 
Hegel’s absolute), or towards a final endpoint (e.g., Peirce’s 
concrete reasonableness); James considers any such teleology to 
be a product of rationalism and absolutism.
66
 Instead, James is 
more likely to use terms such as equivocal or ambivalent to 
describe the universe’s comportment toward which possibilities are 
actualized.
67
 Whether salvation or shipwreck, the universe 
continues on. Note that James does concede that chance is 
compatible with Providence, just as long as that Providence leaves 
open some points to absolute chance.  In other words, James leaves 
the door open for any of the attempts to describe how an event has 
its eternal truth value—fatalism, predetermination, etc.—to be 
compatible with this system, just as long as the observer does not 
claim that every single event is captured by this system. However, 
I think that this is largely a concession to his audience, since it is 
always framed as an overbelief borne of considerations other than 
empirical.
68
 
There are two points we must address in order to avoid 
overstating James’s case. First, we must note that the absence of 
global teleology does not establish the existence of free will, even 
when taken in tandem with the two preceding tenets. James does 
not require for indeterminism to be universal; in fact, he 
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specifically rejects the idea, saying that “indeterminism is no 
universal claimer. It only asks to exist somewhere in the world.”69 
It is still theoretically possible for there to be events which are the 
result of absolute chance without any of those events being a 
mental event where someone decides to pursue x over y. Second, 
even if we were to establish the existence of free will, this does not 
eliminate the role that chance places in determining which 
possibilities are actualized. James notes that our predilections and 
desires are only one factor at play which causes a state of affairs to 
occur. James claims that “[a]s individual members of a pluralistic 
universe, we must recognize that even though we do our best, the 
other factors also will have a voice in the result.”70 Our ability to 
manipulate the probabilities of concrete possibilities is an 
evolutionary adaptation of our central nervous system that allows 
us to improve our chance of survival, but this does not make our 
choice the sole or even an essential feature of the progress of the 
universe.
71
 
We now have a reasonable understanding of James’s account 
of the universe, or what I have called his probabilistic 
underdeterminism. It claims that all events have some probability 
of occurring, and, in the absence of any event with a probability of 
one, which event actually does occur is left to chance. It holds that 
humans have developed the ability to manipulate events so that the 
probability of an event can be either increased or decreased. While 
holding that we can manipulate probabilities through our pursuit of 
ends, James rejects any global teleology for the system, holding 
that the universe, while constantly growing, is ambivalent about 
the direction in which it grows. I offer that these tenets do not 
establish free will; instead, it is left as an overbelief with respect to 
the evidence. This is reflected in James’s declaration that his first 
act of free will is to believe in free will:
72
 He went beyond the 
evidence to posit a belief that makes better sense of experience 
than the alternative.  
It is now clear that the idea that James’s rejection of 
determinism was motivated primarily on personal grounds is 
untenable. James “claim[s] determinism in the interest of scientific 
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activity”73 and rejects logical determinism on scientific grounds. 
However, this does not mean that James was completely in line 
with the science of his day. In the remainder of this paper, I will 
argue that James’s argument against logical determinism is part of 
a broader criticism of the observational sciences of his day.  
 
THE BROADER CRITICISM 
The idea that James’s argument against logical determinism is part 
of a broader criticism against all observation-based sciences can be 
observed in the similar criticism levelled against the introspective 
psychologists of his day (e.g., Wilhelm Wundt, Edward Titchener, 
etc.). James argues that there are certain subjective states—namely, 
the feelings of relation—that can never be accurately captured via 
retrospective introspection. James writes: 
 
As a snowflake caught in the warm hand is no 
longer a flake but a drop, so, instead of catching the 
feeling of relation moving to its term, we find we 
have caught some substantive thing, usually the last 
word we were pronouncing, statically taken, and 
with its function, tendency and particular meaning 
in the sentence quite evaporated. The attempt at 
introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like 
seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or trying 
to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the 
darkness looks.
74
 
 
James thought that the attempts by those such as Wundt or 
Titchener to make their introspective analyses more precise ought 
to be understood as merely getting better at turning up the gas. No 
matter how well they could perfect the process of introspection, or 
how rigorous the standards that they impose on those who engage 
in it, they will always misrepresent a substantial aspect of our 
experience due to the nature of the act of observation. 
Despite this, James still held that introspection was central to 
the science of psychology, for it furnished the data from which 
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psychology built its theories.
75
 The difficulty with introspection 
was “simply that of all observation of whatever kind.”76 James 
notes that while it is tempting to fall into the psychologist’s fallacy 
where one takes one’s observation of a mental event as the mental 
event itself, it is possible to avoid this error if one recognizes 
introspection’s limitations and keeps its distorting effects in 
mind.
77
 James did not reject the works of his predecessors or 
contemporaries as being without value or irredeemable, but rather 
saw that those works needed some specific corrections.
78
 
James’s argument against introspective psychology can be 
generalized to all of the observational sciences of his day; in each 
case, scientists fail to appreciate the depth of the relationship 
between the scientist observing a phenomenon and the 
phenomenon being observed, and the transformative function that 
the observational standpoint of the former has on the data yielded 
about the latter.
79
 In the question of determinism, the effect of 
standpoint is so strong that one ought not to expect to be able to 
find indeterminacy through scientific observation, since the very 
act of observation fixes inherently indeterminate phenomena into 
determinate relations. Scientific observation presupposes a 
viewpoint and certain parameters; indeterminacy vanishes under 
the same viewpoint. In a sense, where observation is, 
indeterminacy is not; where indeterminacy is, observation is not. 
James’s criticisms were not met with an enthusiastic response 
and only fed into the (still-lingering) narrative that James was 
somehow anti-science or unscientific. However, the motivating 
idea behind James’s argument is found throughout the philosophy 
of science and the physical sciences. Niels Bohr’s argument 
against the classical model of physics proceeds on much the same 
grounds.
80
 Bohr argues that predicting a future state of a physical 
system is “only possible if the system is closed, that is, unaffected 
by external disturbances,” but that “any observation of the system 
implies a disturbance.”81 As summarized by historian of physics 
Max Jammer, Bohr argues that “a system, if observed, is always an 
open system. A space-time description, however, presupposes 
observation.”82 Bohr attributes the success of the standard model of 
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physics to the standpoint of the observer: The classical model 
works because of the limited viewpoint of the observer and the 
relatively small amount of data with which she has to work.
83
 Here 
we see the same sort of argument as advanced by James: previous 
accounts of science (in this case, physics) had ignored the 
transformational effect of the act of observation, and once that act 
is considered, the closed iron block universe presupposed by those 
previous accounts becomes untenable.
84
 Similar arguments for the 
importance of the observer in scientific practice can be found in 
the works of Thomas Kuhn,
85
 Paul Feyerabend,
86
 and more 
recently in the work of feminist philosophers of science such as 
Lorraine Code.
87
 
I do not wish to suggest that James is somehow the progenitor 
of this line of reasoning or to suggest that these other figures were 
heavily influenced by James’s thought. Rather, I use these 
examples to suggest that James’s argument against determinism, 
even if generalized to a criticism of the scientific methodologies of 
his day, does not constitute a rejection of the scientific enterprise. 
If it did, then we would have to attribute the same rejection to 
Bohr, most contemporary physicists, and many philosophers of 
science. It also need not be considered an unresolved tension in 
James’s thought between his scientifically-minded self and his 
moralistically-minded self, but rather an objection to the science of 
his day by his scientifically-minded self. James believes that there 
are good scientific reasons to temper one’s expectations of 
scientific investigations and to refrain from applying the scientific 
framework beyond its legitimate bounds. For example, by failing 
to adequately account for the distorting effects of observation, 
people have extended the scientific view past a methodological 
tool and into a cosmological commitment. James notes that the 
main source of logical necessity in our cosmological thinking 
comes from extending the natural sciences in this way, but this is 
an unnecessary move to make and, if James’s argument about 
observation holds, it would be an illegitimate move to make.
88
 
James’s attitude embodies a scientifically-minded approach to 
the question of determinism. James is committing himself to the 
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standpoint that he ought to maintain whichever belief best fits the 
evidence and is willing to defer to scientific consensus on that 
basis.
89
 However, he believes that the evidence for or against both 
determinism and indeterminism will be necessarily inconclusive; 
thus, we must decide between the two on the basis of which thesis 
results in a more coherent worldview when we expand our 
evidence beyond that which is yielded by the practice of science. 
This is the same approach that Robert A. Beard ascribes to James 
in A Pluralistic Universe. Beard claims that James is not showing 
that “Absolute Idealism or any other sort of monism is false, but 
simply that a universe of the sort posited by such philosophies 
would be less rational than a pluralistic one.”90 In the case of 
determinism, James must show the limitations of that viewpoint 
and how his proposed alternative does not suffer from the same 
limitations. This is the exact tack that James takes in his paper 
“The Dilemma of Determinism.” He shows how determinism fails 
regardless of which horn one takes and demonstrates how his own 
view of indeterminism offers a better framework in which to 
understand the data available. This portrait of James’s 
scientifically-minded approach to the question of determinism is a 
far cry from the common narrative of James’s rejection of 
determinism on personal grounds. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has presented a sustained analysis of James’s argument 
against determinism and his proposed alternative. Such an analysis 
presents another key to our understanding of James. James himself 
does not reject all forms of determinism, but rather those forms 
that make some claim about the necessity of future events. As 
such, I argue that a better way of thinking about James’s target is 
logical determinism, the belief that all propositions about future 
events have an eternal and unchanging truth value at the time of 
utterance. James’s argument against logical determinism involves 
its inability to adequately account for the distorting effects that 
observation has on the thing being observed—in this case, on how 
one’s standpoint in the present, with some events being in the past 
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and some in the future, affects how one conceives of the past and 
the different causal structure between past and future events. 
Taking these points into account leads James to propose what I 
refer to as his probabilistic underdeterminism. This view has three 
main tenets—first, chance is a vital force in determining which 
events are actualized; second, choice is capable of manipulating 
the probabilities for or against a particular event; and third, there is 
no global, but only local, teleology. This was presented as a 
particular portion of a much broader criticism of the observational 
sciences of his day. Since observation necessarily distorts that 
which is being observed, science must always account for this 
distorting effect when considering which convenient assumptions 
to take up. Logical determinism not only makes unnecessary and 
unhelpful metaphysical commitments, but is also the product of the 
distorting effect of observation. As such, logical determinism—or 
any of its subspecies, such as fatalism, predeterminism, and 
necessitarianism—is not a viable convenient assumption of 
science. This is a scientifically-motivated argument against the use 
of certain conceptions in science; as such, I submit that it is 
impossible to maintain the view that James rejected determinism 
for primarily personal motivations or on primarily moral grounds.  
 
 
Independent Scholar 
kyle.bromhall@outlook.com 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bain, Alexander. The Emotions and the Will. 3rd ed. New York: D. 
Appleton & Company, 1876. 
Barzun, Jacques. A Stroll with William James. New York: Harper 
& Row, 1983. 
Beard, Robert. “James and the Rationality of Determinism.” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 5, no. 2 (April 1967): 
149–56. 
AN INCHOATE UNIVERSE                                                                                  76 
WILLIAM JAMES STUDIES                                 VOL 14 • NO 1 • SPRING 2018 
Bradley, F. H. “Is There Any Special Activity of Attention?” Mind 
11, no. 43 (July, 1886): 305–23. 
Code, Lorraine. Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations. 
New York: Routledge, 1995. 
Croce, Paul. “The Probabilistic Revolution and the Chance-Filled 
Universe of William James.” Intellectual History Newsletter 13 
(1991): 19–32. 
Feyerabend, Paul. Against Method. 4th ed. New York: Verso, 
2010. 
Folse, Henry. The Philosophy of Niels Bohr: The Framework of 
Complementarity. New York: North-Holland Physics 
Publishing, 1985. 
Gale, Richard. The Divided Self of William James. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Gavin, William. “William James’s Philosophy of Science.” New 
Scholasticism 52, no. 3 (1978): 413–20. 
James, William. The Correspondence of William James. Vol. 6: 
1885-1889. Edited by Ignas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. 
Berkeley. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 
1998. 
———. Essays in Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983. 
———. Manuscript Essays and Notes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988. 
———. The Meaning of Truth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1975. 
———. Pragmatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1975. 
———. The Principles of Psychology. 3 vols. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1981. 
———. Some Problems of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1979. 
———. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979. 
Jammer, Max. Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. 
KYLE BROMHALL                                                                                                77 
 
WILLIAM JAMES STUDIES                                 VOL 14 • NO 1 • SPRING 2018 
Kaiser, David. “More Roots of Complementarity: Kantian Aspects 
and Influences.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
and Technology 23, no. 2 (1992): 213–39. 
Klein, Alexander. “Divide et Impera! William James’s Pragmatist 
Tradition in the Philosophy of Science.” Philosophical Topics 
36:1 (Spring 2008): 129–166. 
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 50
th
 
Anniversary Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
Lucas, J.R. The Freedom of the Will. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970. 
McDermott, John, ed. The Writings of William James. New York: 
The Modern Library, 1968. 
McGranahan, Lucas. Darwinism and Pragmatism: William James 
on Evolution and Self-Transformation. New York: Routledge, 
2017. 
Richardson, Robert D. William James In the Maelstrom of 
American Modernism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
2006. 
Ryle, Gilbert. Dilemmas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1954. 
Seigfried, Charlene Haddock. William James’s Radical 
Reconstruction of Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1990. 
Spencer, Herbert. The Principles of Psychology. 3rd ed. New 
York: D. Appleton & Co., 1905. 
Stapp, Henry. Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics. 3rd ed. 
Berlin: Springer, 2009. 
 
 
NOTES 
I would like to thank the following people for their constructive 
and insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper: Randy 
Spencer, Bonnie Sheehey, Russell Duvernoy, Paul Croce, Ermine 
Algaier, and the two anonymous referees at William James Studies. 
1
 Richardson, Maelstrom of American Modernism, 101. 
 
AN INCHOATE UNIVERSE                                                                                  78 
WILLIAM JAMES STUDIES                                 VOL 14 • NO 1 • SPRING 2018 
 
2
 Barzun, A Stroll with William James, 16. 
3
 McDermott, Writings of William James, xxvii. 
4
 Richardson, Maelstrom of American Modernism, 176. 
5
 McDermott, Writings of William James, 7. 
6
 Ibid., xxvii. 
7
 Gale, The Divided Self, 80–81. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid.,79. 
10
 Ibid.,79–81. 
11
 See Haddock Seigfried, Radical Reconstruction, esp. 11–12. 
12
 See McDermott, Writings of William James, esp. xx–xxvii. 
13
 Richardson, Maelstrom of American Modernism, 246–47. 
14
 James, Principles, 6. 
15 For a comprehensive account of the reception of the 
scientific community to James’s claim and how it has subsequently 
transformed the philosophy of science, see Klein, “Divide et 
Impera!” 
16
 James, Essays in Psychology, 271. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 77n., 78. 
19
 Ibid. For further information regarding how these convenient 
assumptions are tested empirically, or whether it is appropriate for 
science to employ them in the first place, see Klein, 141–45. 
20
 James, Essays in Psychology, 272. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 James, Will to Believe, 445. 
23
 James, Pragmatism, 59. While it is beyond the scope of the 
present paper to address this point in any sufficient length, the 
rejection mentioned above also problematizes the idea that James 
was a voluntarist, since it cuts James off from the agent-causal 
mechanism required for a thoroughgoing voluntarism.  
24
 James, Correspondence, 6:119. This sentiment is also found 
in Gale (see 78–80). 
25
 James, Will to Believe, 132. 
 
KYLE BROMHALL                                                                                                79 
 
WILLIAM JAMES STUDIES                                 VOL 14 • NO 1 • SPRING 2018 
 
26
 Ibid., 117–18. This passage is central to Gale’s claim that 
James’s definition of determinism was question-begging and 
rhetorical (Gale, The Divided Self, 80). While the passage does 
display some of James’s characteristic rhetorical flourishes, it is 
important to note, as does Barzun (16), that this definition reflected 
a real and widespread view in James’s day. A prime example of 
this was the standard view of the organism among associationist 
psychologists which reduced all behavior to an inevitable by-
product of the laws of nature and the organism’s physiology. 
Examples can be seen in the works of influential figures such as F. 
H. Bradley (See Bradley “Is There Any Special Activity of 
Attention?” esp. 360), Herbert Spencer (See Spencer, Principles of 
Psychology, esp. 185–90), and Alexander Bain (See Bain, The 
Emotions and the Will, esp. 369-71). 
27
 Gale, The Divided Self, 80. 
28
 James, Manuscript Essays and Notes, 34. 
29
 James, Problems, 102–103. 
30
 James, Correspondence, 6:111, 119–20, 180–81. 
31
 Ryle, Dilemmas, 15.  
32
 Lucas, The Freedom of the Will, 65. 
33
 James, Correspondence, 6:180. Given Hodgson’s thorough- 
going and unflinching antipathy to the concept of chance, I would 
wager that the frustration was mutual (see Ibid., 119).  
34
 James, Will to Believe, 123. 
35
 James, Manuscript Essays and Notes, 34. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid., 34–35. 
38
 Ibid., 34. 
39
 James, Pragmatism, 136. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 James, Manuscript Essays and Notes, 158. 
44
 James, Will to Believe, 121. 
 
AN INCHOATE UNIVERSE                                                                                  80 
WILLIAM JAMES STUDIES                                 VOL 14 • NO 1 • SPRING 2018 
 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Ibid., 123. 
48
 Ibid., 118. 
49
 A few words about the intent and scope of my claims are in 
order. I do not wish to claim that James explicitly argued for this 
view, or that he had this account in mind when he was arguing 
against determinism. Instead, my claim is that the three tenets 
mentioned, taken together, constitute a coherent worldview that 
effectively rebuts logical determinism. While James himself may 
never have advanced this position, all three tenets are stable 
features of James’s thought that appear throughout both his 
psychological and philosophical works. 
50
 For an in-depth examination of the role of Darwinism in 
James’s thought, see McGranahan, Darwinism and Pragmatism. 
51
 James, Essays in Psychology, 53. 
52
 James, Will to Believe, 120. 
53
 James’s lifelong commitment to probability is an 
underexplored aspect of James’s thought. Paul Croce notes that 
James was a pioneering figure in the advancement of statistically-
informed probabilistic reasoning in both his scientific and 
philosophical writings (Croce, “The Probablistic Revolution,” 28–
29). Setting James apart from the more mathematically minded 
Peirce is James’s attitude towards the end product of scientific 
inquiry: Peirce turned towards “fallibilism, with the anticipation of 
ultimate certainties,” while James “held out hope for a more 
thorough-going indeterminism” through the “embrace of chance 
and uncertainty” (James, Will to Believe, 29). As Croce notes, 
James did not have to reject science in this endeavour; broadly 
speaking, science was already moving away from determinism and 
towards probabilism even while James was a young scholar. 
54
 James, Will to Believe, 118. 
55
 Ibid. 
 
KYLE BROMHALL                                                                                                81 
 
WILLIAM JAMES STUDIES                                 VOL 14 • NO 1 • SPRING 2018 
 
56
 For James’s take on what these might be, see Some Problems 
of Philosophy, 113-15. 
57
 James, Will to Believe, 118–19. 
58
 While my language may occasionally suggest otherwise, I do 
not mean to suggest that chance is a positive causal force. I 
acknowledge that for James, chance purely denotes the negative 
state of not having a particular sufficient cause.  
59
 James, Manuscript Essays and Notes, 159. 
60
 James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 80. 
61
 James, Manuscript Essays and Notes, 159. 
62
 James, Pragmatism, 137. 
63
 Ibid., 138. 
64
 There is an interesting parallel between the second tenet and 
James’s distinction between ideo-motor and wilful action in his 
psychology. In ideo-motor action, behavior follows unhesitatingly 
from one’s conception of what to do (James, Principles, 1141). In 
wilful action, there are multiple competing, equally attractive ideas 
of how to proceed that are inhibiting each other’s successful 
discharge into bodily movement. We feel that even though we 
have sufficient information to make a decision one way or another, 
there is no “imperative principle of choice between them,” and we 
are left at a loss of what to do. In other words, our previously 
existing habits underdetermine which course of action to take 
(Ibid.). In these cases, James thinks that “we feel . . . as if we 
ourselves by our own wilful act “inclined the beam” to act in one 
way over another, thus resolving the stalemate and bringing about 
one state of affairs (Ibid.). In a sense, James’s account of wilful 
behavior is a microcosmic version of James’s account of the 
progress of the universe.  
65
 James, Will to Believe, 123; Pragmatism, 142–43. 
66
 James, Will to Believe, 133–34, 136.  
67
 See James, Pragmatism, 136–37. 
68
 See James, Pragmatism, 136–37; James, Will to Believe, 
138–40. 
 
AN INCHOATE UNIVERSE                                                                                  82 
WILLIAM JAMES STUDIES                                 VOL 14 • NO 1 • SPRING 2018 
 
69
 James, Will to Believe, 445. 
70
 James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 115. 
71
 See James, Principles, 1221–22. 
72
 McDermott, 7. 
73
 James, Will to Believe, 445. 
74
 James, Essays in Psychology, 144. 
75
 James, Principles, 185. 
76
 Ibid., 191. Emphasis in original. 
77
 Ibid., 195. 
78
 Ibid., 191–93. 
79
 See James, Essays in Psychology, 145–46; James, Principles, 
193–95, 434–35, 651–53; James, The Meaning of Truth, 135; etc. 
For another take on how James’s reflections on the nature of 
observation affected his understanding of science, see Gavin, 
“William James’s Philosophy of Science,” 413–20. Gavin employs 
considerations about the role of observation (specifically the role 
that the observer’s subjective interest has on his or her preferred 
scientific hypotheses) to argue that James’s implicit philosophy of 
science was distinctly anti-positivistic and anti-Baconian. While 
Gavin discusses this in relation to theoretical entities such as 
atoms, electrons, etc., he does not extend this to the complexion of 
the future. 
80
 Jammer, Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, 
184. 
81
 Ibid., 366. 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 Ibid., 366-67. 
84
 There is much dispute over whether or to what extent Bohr 
was influenced by James on this point. Key to this debate is 
whether Bohr read James prior to 1932. Jammer, Henry Folse, and 
others claim that Bohr had read James while he was a student at 
the University of Copenhagen around 1904 (Jammer, Conceptual 
Development, 184; Folse, The Philosophy of Niels Bohr, 49–51); 
David Kaiser notes that Bohr himself suggested that this was the 
 
KYLE BROMHALL                                                                                                83 
 
WILLIAM JAMES STUDIES                                 VOL 14 • NO 1 • SPRING 2018 
 
case. (Kaiser, “More Roots of Complementarity,” 224–25.) 
However, even if Bohr had read James early in his career, this does 
not necessarily mean that James was a direct or even significant 
influence. According to Kaiser, the consensus view is that Bohr’s 
exposure to James in his early career was filtered through Bohr’s 
philosophy professor, Harald Høffding, making any influence 
murky (Ibid., 225n.). Given the inconclusiveness of the debate and 
its peripheral importance to my present argument, I will note the 
similarity but not make any further commitment to the connection 
with Bohr.  
I also suggest that James’s work has found favor with more 
recent quantum physicists, and thus there appears to be the 
possibility of a fruitful exchange. See Stapp, Mind, Matter, and 
Quantum Mechanics, 131–34, 227–28. 
85
 See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, esp. 126–
27. 
86
 See Feyerabend, Against Method, esp. 46–60. 
87
 See Code, Rhetorical Spaces, esp. 23–57. 
88
 James, Manuscript Essays and Notes, 40. 
89
 James, Will to Believe, 119–20. 
90
 Beard, “James and the Rationality of Determinism,” 150. 
